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Abstract

This article offers a critical survey of the mechanisms controlling public administration in Morocco at the central level. Distinguishing internal from external controls, the author first examines internal administrative controls - the 'apparent' controls exercised by inspection bodies with limited or extended competence (notably the General Inspectorate of Administrative Services and the General Inspectorate of Finance) and the 'presumed' controls inherent in administrative hierarchy, whether exercised ex officio or upon appeal by citizens. He then analyses external controls: judicial review before the Supreme Court, financial control by the recently established Court of Accounts, parliamentary control through written and oral questions, and the informal 'quasi-controls' of public opinion and the media. The study concludes that, as in most developing countries, these controls remain underdeveloped and largely ineffective: judicial review is weak, the Court of Accounts is still nascent, and political oversight amounts to influence rather than genuine control.

DOI

10.66499/2665-7112.1644

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