Abstract
Social litigation increasingly fuels the activity of the courts. Employers tend to feel that judges are growing ever more lenient toward employees and that social trials systematically favor them, while employees, for their part, are dissatisfied with the slowness of proceedings—a slowness that varies from one jurisdiction to another, mirrored by inconsistent case law on compensation for abusive dismissal. To avoid judicial delay and the unpleasant surprises of court decisions, employers have, especially over the past decade, resorted to various devices, the most common being the so-called "negotiated resignation," whereby the employer effectively buys the employee's departure—a practice viewed with suspicion by case law. The author focuses instead on a procedure long neglected by both practitioners and legal theorists: the settlement agreement (transaction). Distinguishing it from resignation, he defines the transaction as a bilateral mode of contract termination, crowning a mutual agreement by which employer and employee decide to end the employment relationship, and examines its scope within social law.
Recommended Citation
Kettani, Azzedine
(1990)
"Settlement Agreements and Social Law,"
Revue Marocaine de Droit, d'Economie et de Gestion (Moroccan Journal of Law, Economics and Management): Vol. 9:
Iss.
1, Article 20.
https://doi.org/10.66499/2665-7112.1678
Available at:
https://scholarhub.univh2c.ma/remadeg/vol9/iss1/20
DOI
10.66499/2665-7112.1678